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Newly compiled data has shown that income mobility-the probability that the 
children of the poor will reach higher incomes than their parents- varies across the 
United States. However, the causes for the full extent of such variation remain to be 
explained. This study combines Census data on local government expenditures with the 
new data on income mobility to test the hypothesis that local government expenditures 
affect income mobility. My results indicate that a statistically significant relationship 
exists between expenditures and mobility, but also that the timing and type of 
expenditure can determine whether the effect is positive, negative, or even matters at 
all. Why such different consequences exist should be the subject of further study. 
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1. Introduction 
The probability that Americans will rise to higher income percentiles over the 
course of their lives varies across the United States. For example, children who were 
born below the twenty-fifth income percentile in Salt Lake City in 1980 and 1981 rose, 
on average, to the forty-sixth percentile as adults, while those born in Charlotte, North 
Carolina on average climbed only to the thirty-fifth percentile (Chetty et. al 2013). The 
cause of this variation across American cities remains to be explained. One possibility is 
that the actions of local governments play a significant role in helping low-income 
residents enter the middle class. Because local government entities such as 
municipalities, counties and school districts provide public services to the region, local 
government expenditures may play a significant role in residents’ economic mobility. 
Local governments spend money to provide public goods in their region. In 
2011, total local government expenditures in the United States exceeded $1.6 trillion. In 
comparison federal government non-defense expenditures, for the 2011 fiscal year 
amounted to $2.9 trillion and discretionary spending totaled only $700 billion.1  While 
the roles of local governments vary by type and place, their expenditures include fire 
protection, public safety, parks and recreation, utilities, economic development, 
education, and transportation. Any of these services might affect the economic 
landscape of the city. Better transportation infrastructure might lower the costs of 
commuting to work. Improvements in the local police force could correspond to                                                         
1 Local government expenditure levels come from the U.S. Census Bureau, “State and Local Government 
Finances Summary: 2011”, July 2011, accessed March 30, 2014, 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/local/summary_report.pdf. Federal Expenditures come from the 
Congressional Budget Office “The U.S. Federal Budget,” Accessed April 7, 2014. 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/new/budgetinfographic.png. 
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reductions in the crime rate, which creates a better environment for children to thrive. 
As local governments provide these services, an additional outcome might be the 
increased ability of low-income households to enter the middle class.  
Research into income mobility in the United States recently benefited from the 
work of Chetty et. al (2013), who measured variation in income mobility across 
commuting zones in the United States. (Commuting zones are local geographic units 
that are similar to metropolitan statistical areas in size, but include rural areas and thus 
cover the entire United States.) Their data revealed that the economic outcomes of 
Americans varied significantly depending on where they were born (Figure 1). It also 
prompted further questions about the causes for each commuting zone’s different level 
of income mobility. In their study, Chetty et. al focus on the effects of progressive tax 
expenditures on income mobility and show a positive relationship.2 They note, 
however, that tax expenditures only explain part of the variation in income mobility 
across commuting zones. Interestingly, they place local government expenditures in 
1992 among a list of variables that are correlated with income mobility, but which 
require further study. I seek to test whether local government expenditures affect a 
commuting zone’s income mobility. 
 I combine local government expenditures data from the Census Survey of 
Governments with data on income mobility created by Chetty et. al to estimate the 
relationship between local government expenditures and income mobility for children 
born in 1980 to 1981. I hypothesize that local government expenditures should have a 
                                                        
2 Tax expenditures are exemptions from taxation.  For example, some of the tax expenditures considered 
by Chetty et. al are tax credits that relieve low-income individuals from part of their tax payment in order 
to provide them with greater resources. 
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positive effect on income mobility i.e. places that increase public expenditures should 
benefit from increases in income mobility. My results indicate that local government 
expenditures have a significant effect on income mobility. However the type of effect 
depends on the timing of expenditures and the category of service that they fund.  
2. Data 
The Census Survey of Governments compiles annual finance records—revenues 
and expenditures—for local governments. The survey samples every government unit—
counties, municipalities, school districts, townships and special districts—for years 
ending in “2” or “7.” For the other years, the survey samples a non-random subset of 
government units that emphasizes larger cities. To avoid the bias of excluded 
government units that may affect my data, I focus on local government expenditure data 
for the years ending in “2” and “7” when all governments were sampled. For each of 
these years, I focus on variables that measure total expenditures by the governments, 
and specific expenditures on welfare and education. 3  
All finance data for local government units in the Census Survey of 
Governments existed originally as an observation of each local government unit. Those 
units that were part of the same county (including the county government itself) were 
added together to form observations of the total amount of expenditures by all local 
governments within a county. Each observation in the dataset then represents the total 
expenditures by local government entities within that county for a given year. Using 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) codes, which are 5-digit codes that 
                                                        
3 “Annual Survey of Governments Finance Data,” National Bureau of Economic Research, accessed 
March 2, 2014, http://www.nber.org/asg/. 
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uniquely identify counties within the United States and were added to the Census 
Survey of Governments data by researchers at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, I assigned each county-year observation to the list of commuting zones 
provided by Chetty et. al. After this, the data observations denoted total local 
government expenditures by all governments within a commuting zone.  
The Census also provides demographic data that I use as controls to isolate the 
effect of local government expenditures in my model. Regional characteristics, 
including racial composition, income, and median age are available at the county level 
from the Census. Data prior 1990, is available in the Census’s City and County Data 
Books, available online from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research. From that source I compiled measurements of the median age, 
unemployment, prevalence of manufacturing, racial composition, public school 
enrollment, social security payment recipients, divorce rate, crime rate, median income 
and median house prices for the 1980s. I gathered data for the same variables for the 
1990s from the US Census Counties database. A summary statistics table of these 
covariates is shown in Table 6 of the Appendix. 
The income mobility data was created by Chetty et. al (2013). This variable is 
measured by recording the incomes for the generation of children born in 1980 and 
1981 at two points in their lives. The child’s household income is first recorded in 1996 
when the child is approximately 15 years old. The child’s household income is 
measured again in 2011, when they are adults. The first measurement of income in 1996 
is taken as “parent income” and the second in 2011 as “child adult income.” Then, 
parent income is regressed on child income. This regression represents the expected 
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level of child income given a certain level of parent income, and provides the measure 
of mobility. This regression is written in the following equation: 
yic = γc + ηcxic +εic  (1) 
for individual i in commuting zone c, where y is child income percentile and x is parent 
income percentile, γ is an intercept and ε is an error term. Thus, the coefficient in this 
regression represents the effect of parent income rank on child rank. Then define  
𝑦�pc = γc + ηcp  (2) 
as the expected income percentile of child for parent income percentile, p. This 
expected value of child income, given parent income, sets the basis for measuring 
income mobility. Using this model, Chetty et. al provide two types of mobility 
measurement, relative and absolute. Relative mobility represents the difference between 
the expected outcomes for the richest versus the poorest. Thus, it is the slope of parent 
income with respect to child income, multiplied by 100. This is interpreted as the 
difference in expected outcomes of an individual born in the top percentile and the 
person born in the bottom percentile (𝒚�100,c – 𝒚�0,c = 100 ×  ηc). On the other hand, 
absolute mobility asks how high individuals born into low incomes are expected to rise.  
In particular, it represents the expected income percentile of individuals born into the 
bottom fourth of income percentiles. Absolute mobility equals 𝒚�25,c and represents the 
expected outcome for somebody born into the 25th income percentile, the bottom 
quartile, defined by parental income in 1996, when the child is approximately 15. 
It should be noted that CZ’s are assigned permanently for the location of the 
child’s residence at the age of fifteen. Therefore, this location assignment does not 
account for moving after or before the age of 15 and does not indicate that the child 
  
6  
spent all or most of his or her youth in that CZ. For local government expenditures, like 
public safety or transportation, the benefit of the public good would only be received if 
the individual lived in that CZ for an extended period of time and didn’t move. 
3. Methodology 
In an attempt to investigate the relationship between per capita expenditures and 
income mobility, I seek to test two main possibilities: 
1) Per capita expenditures have a significant relationship with income mobility. If 
the relationship between expenditures and mobility is positive, this would 
suggest that local government expenditures tend to provide an environment 
and/or opportunities that help low income individuals to achieve higher 
incomes. If the two variables presented a negative relationship, this would 
suggest that expenditures interrupt instead of facilitate mobility. For example, 
bad policies may make it harder for individuals to access the opportunities that 
lead to advancement.  
2) Per capita expenditures do not have a significant relationship with income 
mobility. This may mean that while local government expenditures provide 
public services, those services do not help the poor achieve higher incomes. For 
example, public safety, good parks, housing, and transportation may improve the 
quality of life for residents but an insignificant relationship would suggest that 
the combined impact of these services has a negligible impact on income 
mobility. Alternatively an insignificant relationship might suggest that how 
governments spend their money matters more than how much they spend and 
thus without observing efficiency or quality of expenditures, the “true” effect of 
  
7  
good local expenditures cannot be measured. Charles Tiebout’s model suggests, 
for example, that the allocation of public goods may be inferior where 
individuals feel less mobile or are less informed about local government 
expenditures (Tiebout 1956).  
To test the hypotheses described above, I estimate the linear effect of per capita 
expenditures on income mobility in the following model with an intercept and a set of 
controls for other commuting zone-specific effects: 
IMi = α + β1’PCExpi + β2CZ’i + δ1Pop’i + δ2Statei + εi (3) 
 
Here IM represents the level of income mobility for each commuting zone, i. PCExp 
denotes a vector of variables that I use to measure per capita expenditures. CZ’ denotes 
a vector of commuting zone characteristic controls. Pop is a vector of population size 
dummy variables. State is a vector of state fixed effects, α is an intercept and ε is an 
error term.  
The estimate of β1’, the coefficient on PCExp, is the primary parameter of 
interest for this study. This coefficient represents the effect on income mobility of an 
increase in per capita expenditures. I estimate β1’ with two different measures of 
expenditures per capita. First, I include expenditures as two different variables, each 
representing the mean expenditures of each of the two decades following the child’s 
birth (1980s, and 1990s). This regression takes the following form: 
IMi = α + β1,1 PCExp 1980s,i + β1,2’ PCExp 1990s,i + β2’CZ’i 
+ δ1’Pop’i + δ2’Statei‘ + εi (4) 
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Second, I include expenditures as four variables representing the total amount 
spent in years ending in 2 or 7 for each of the two decades.  
IMi = α + β1,1PCExp 1982,i + β1,2PCExp 1987,i + β1,3 PCExp 1992,I 
+ β1,4PCExp 1997,i+ β2CZ’i + δ1Pop’i + δ2Statei + εi  (5) 
 
As described in the Data section, expenditures means the sum of expenditures for every 
local government unit within the commuting zone, including counties, municipalities, 
townships, school districts, and special districts. I do not count state expenditures 
because the aggregate Census data does not specify which commuting zone the state 
money went to. Thus state expenditures from this data source could not explain 
commuting zone-level variation in income mobility.  
Per capita expenditures are measured for separate time periods, but the periods 
are highly correlated with each other (Tables 1 and 2). Thus, they are likely to introduce 
multicollinearity into the model, making estimation of the individual parameters 
difficult. Therefore, I include analysis of the joint significance of different measures of 
expenditures in addition to analysis of individual parameters. The variables are adjusted 
for inflation so that estimation of the total effect of the sum of parameters is accurate 
when spanning decades. 
The effect of per capita expenditures on income mobility may be subject to 
economies of scale. For example, the size of a city may affect the relationship. Holcomb 
and Williams (2008) suggest that economies of scale may affect per capita expenditures 
across quartile population ranks, but not within these groups. Therefore, I include Pop, 
which is a vector of dummy variables for the first, second and third quartile of 
population rank of the commuting zone.  
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Local government roles vary from state to state. For example, in some states, 
municipal authorities provide K-12 education while in other states a separate local 
government, like a school district, provides that service. To account for these across-
state differences in local government functions I adopt Holcomb and Williams (2008) 
method of inserting a set of dummy variables for each state, represented by State in 
equations (3)-(5). These state fixed effects account for variation in state characteristics, 
such as demographics and politics for example, as well as variation in state expenditures 
across states.  
Beyond local government expenditures, many other characteristics of 
commuting zones may correlate with both per capita expenditures and income mobility. 
Excluding these variables would lead to omitted variable bias in my estimates of local 
government expenditures. To control for these factors, I include a set of CZ 
characteristic controls for each of the decades in which I measure local government 
expenditures, represented by CZ’ in equations (3) through (5). These controls are: 
median age, unemployment rate, percentage of people employed in manufacturing, 
percentage of population that is white, number of children enrolled in public school per 
number of people, percent of social security recipients, divorce rate, crime rate, median 
income and median house prices for each of the two decades in which I measure local 
government expenditures, the 1980s and 1990s. A summary statistics table for these 
covariates is provided in Table 6. 
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4. Results 
To investigate the relationship between local government expenditures and 
income mobility, I use the model described above to regress income mobility on 
expenditures and a set of controls. Below, I present the results of the regressions. 
I first regress absolute mobility on mean expenditures for each of the two 
decades, excluding all other controls (Table 3, Column 1). In this regression, the 
coefficients on expenditures in the 1980’s and 1990’s are both statistically significant at 
the 0.1% level. The coefficient on the 1980’s is negative and equal to −0.881 while the 
coefficient on the 1990’s is positive and equal to 1.619. The negative coefficient on 
1980s expenditures suggests that an increase in expenditures actually leads to a 
reduction in mobility for low-income individuals. However, the positive coefficient on 
the 1990’s suggests the opposite; that greater per capita expenditures increase mobility. 
The summed effect of these variables is positive and significant at the 0.1% level with a 
coefficient of 0.738. This joint coefficient means that a $1,000 increase in local 
government expenditures within a commuting zone increases the expected income 
percentile for an individual born at or below the 25th percentile by 0.738 percentiles.  
To account for the probable omitted variable bias when per capita expenditures 
are the only independent variables, I estimate the same coefficients, when including a 
set of commuting zone characteristic controls (Table 3, Column 2). When these 
commuting zone controls are added, the estimated effect of per capita expenditures 
shrink in magnitude, suggesting that excluding the controls did lead to omitted variables 
bias. With the controls included, the coefficient on 1980’s expenditures is now 
statistically significant only at the 10% level, but still negative, equaling −0.170. The 
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variable for 1990’s expenditures is still positive at 0.319, but also statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Jointly, the sum effect of these variables is also statistically 
significant at the 10% level and positive with a coefficient of 0.149. The interpretation 
of this coefficient says that a $1,000 increase in per capita expenditures over the period 
of both decades increases the expected income of an individual born into the bottom 
quartile by 0.149 percentiles.  
Including state fixed effects increases the magnitude and statistical significance 
of the parameters on expenditure variables, so that the individual parameters are now 
significant at the 5% level and their joint effect is significant at the 5% level (Table 3, 
Column 3). Individually the coefficient on per capita expenditures in the 1980s is again 
negative and equal to −0.237 while the coefficient on the 1990’s expenditures is 
positive and equal to 0.407. Together, the summed the effect of these parameters is also 
positive and equal to 0.171, and statistically significant only at the 5% level. The 
inclusion of state fixed effects increases the goodness of fit of the regression from 0.797 
to 0.892. 
In order to test the possibility that the individual year, and not just the decade of 
expenditure matters, I regress income mobility on four expenditure variables for which 
the year-specific data is available (Table 4, Column 1). In this regression, the parameter 
estimates for expenditures in 1982 and 1992 are both statistically insignificant. 
However, the coefficients for 1987 and 1997 are negative and positive, respectively, 
and both statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on 1987 expenditures 
equals −1.364 while the coefficient on 1997 expenditures equals 2.033. The summed 
effect of all four variables is statistically significant the 0.1% level that amounts to 
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0.799, suggesting that an increase in expenditures of $1,000 for a year within the years 
recorded leads to an increase in the expected income percentile of an individual born 
into the 25th percentile by 0.799 percentiles (Table 4, Column 1).  
The inclusion of commuting zone controls reduces the magnitude, of the 
parameter estimates of the individual years (Table 4, Column 2). The coefficient on 
1987 has a negative effect that is statistically significant at the 5% level and equal to 
−0.677. The coefficient on 1992 has a positive coefficient equal to 0.423, but is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The summed effect of all four coefficients is 
positive, but not statistically significant, and smaller than when commuting zone 
characteristic controls were excluded. 
The addition of state fixed effects increases the statistical significance of the 
parameters on 1987 and 1997 expenditures, however the effect of expenditures in 1992 
becomes statistically insignificant. The individual estimates for 1987 and 1997 are now 
statistically significant at the 0.1% and 5% significance level, respectively, and all four 
parameters have an added effect that is significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on 
per capita expenditures from 1987 equals −0.587 and is significant at the 0.1% level, 
while the coefficient on per capita expenditures from 1997 equals 0.383 and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The added effect of all four years is statistically 
significant at the 10% level and positive, equaling 0.148. Including state fixed effects 
and CZ demographic controls, the R-squared is equal to 0.893, up from 0.799, when 
state fixed effects are excluded. 
In order to begin the work of estimating the different effect of particular 
categories of expenditures, I look at two specific categories that may have a stated goal 
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of helping low-income children rise out of poverty, education and public welfare 
expenditures. I regress absolute mobility on per capita expenditures for education, 
public welfare, and “other” categories for the means of the sampled years in the 1980s 
and the 1990s (Table 5, Column 1). In this regression, the parameter on per capita 
expenditures on welfare in the 1980s is statistically significant at the 10% level and 
positive, equal to 8.974.  The coefficient on education expenditures in the 1990s is 
positive, equal to 4.430 and statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The coefficient on 
per capita expenditures on other services in the 1980s is statistically significant at the 
0.1% level and negative, equaling −0.808. The summed effect of education 
expenditures in both decades is statistically significant at the 0.1% level and positive, 
equaling 4.697. 
When CZ demographic controls are added to this regression, statistical 
significance disappears for all but the parameters on public welfare expenditures. The 
effect of public welfare expenditures in the 1980s gains statistical significance, and now 
has a positive parameter of 6.611 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Expenditures on other categories for each decade are no longer statistically significant. 
The sum of the effect of education expenditures from both periods is positive, equaling 
0.788, but only significant at the 10% level. The summed effect of public welfare 
expenditures is statistically significant at the 0.1% level and positive, at 3.031.  
The introduction of state fixed effects into this regression (Table 5, Column 3) 
substantially changes the direction and significance level of these coefficients. The 
individual decade parameters for education and public welfare are now all statistically 
insignificant. Real capita expenditures on other categories in the 1990s are statistically 
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significant at the 5% level and positive, equaling 0.396. The summed effect of per 
capita expenditures on education in the 1980s and 1990s is statistically insignificant 
while those for public welfare in the 1980s and 1990s are only significant at the 10% 
level, but large and negative, equaling −3.209, with a 95% confidence interval spanning 
−6.973 to 0.554. When including state fixed effects, the summed effect of other per 
capita expenditures is positive, equaling 0.205, and significant at the 0.1% level. 
As suggested by the regressions above, one factor that may determine the 
importance of local government expenditures on income mobility in different 
commuting zones is the way that local governments spend their money. I provide a 
breakdown of the general composition of expenditures divided between welfare, 
education and other categories in Figures 2 through 4. In these pie charts, public welfare 
makes up approximately 2% of average local government spending across commuting 
zones, education makes up over 40%, and other expenditures amount to over 55% of 
expenditures.  
In Figure 5, I provide a pie chart that shows the average amount spent on a 
selection of additional spending categories. While the effect of these additional 
categories on income mobility is not considered in this study, further research may 
consider their role in regional income mobility. This chart reveals that education makes 
up the single largest category with over 41% of the total spending by local governments 
from 1982 to 1997. Other categories that may be expected have an effect on income 
mobility (if only because they absorb funds that might otherwise improve income 
mobility) add up to slightly less than 20% of local government spending in the same 
period. Other types of spending, which may include administration, utilities and 
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infrastructure costs among others amount to over a third of the remaining spending from 
1982 to 1997 with over 39% of total local government spending. 
5. Discussion 
My results point to a statistically significant relationship between local 
government expenditures and income mobility. When controlling for commuting zone 
demographic controls and state fixed effects, my results reveal that various measures of 
local government expenditures have a statistically significant relationship with income 
mobility. However, the results suggest that the kind of effect that expenditures create 
depends on the timing of spending and the types of programs that receive the 
expenditures. 
The results shown in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the effect of local government 
expenditures fluctuates across time periods. For example, an increase in per capita 
expenditures of $1,000 in 1987 alone decreases mobility by 0.587 percentiles while an 
equal increase in expenditures in 1997 improves mobility by 0.383 percentiles. Put 
another way, an increase in local government expenditures in 1987 worsens the 
expected outcome for individuals born into the bottom quartile while the same level of 
expenditures in 1997 improves the expected outcome for the same individual. These 
results suggest that the timing of expenditures makes a significant difference in their 
effect, even leading to opposite effects in one period versus another. While this study 
cannot conclude what causes such different consequences of expenditures, these results 
suggest that there may be a relationship between the time that expenditures increase, 
with respect to the child’s age, and the effect of expenditures on that child. 
Alternatively, different time periods may matter, not via the age of the child, but 
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because the composition of expenditures or the policies were different in the 1987 from 
the 1997. In order to better understand the relationship between expenditures and 
income mobility, future research could explore how expenditures impact individuals 
differently at different times. 
In the next set of regressions shown in Table 5, I highlight two categories of 
local government expenditures that may be expected to have a stated goal of improving 
outcomes for low-income individuals. However, somewhat surprising results suggest 
that public welfare expenditures have a negative effect on income mobility and that 
education expenditures have little impact at all. 
The coefficient on local government expenditures on public welfare in Table 5, 
Column 3 suggest that an increase of $1,000 per capita by local governments on public 
welfare may decrease the expected income percentile of an individual born into the 
bottom quartile by over 3 percentiles, even when controlling for indicators of poverty 
within a commuting zone. This coefficient is only significant at the 10% level and it’s 
95% confidence interval spans -6.972  to .555. Thus, these results cannot rule out the 
possibility that welfare expenditures have either a negligible or a positive effect on 
mobility. However the large negative coefficient contradicts the results that we might 
expect from successful welfare expenditures. Such expenditures might be expected to 
provide an improved quality of life for children born into poverty and thus better 
opportunities to reach higher incomes as adults. However, while these results are not 
conclusive evidence that welfare expenditures worsen conditions for the children of the 
poor, they do not support a view that such expenditures help low-income children rise 
out of poverty.  
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While, this study cannot conclude why such a negative relationship exists 
between welfare and mobility, we can speculate about some possibilities. First, welfare 
expenditures may support unsuccessful polices. Perhaps, for example, welfare 
expenditures fund subsidized housing projects that isolate low-income individuals away 
from career opportunities. While these expenditures may then provide important 
services for the poor, such as housing, the way that they are provided may introduce 
other costs onto the poor. Alternatively, as some argue, these programs may create 
dependence on welfare and remove incentives to pursue well-paying jobs. Along this 
argument, welfare expenditures, in principle, may hurt rather than help the poor. 
In addition to the negative parameter on public welfare expenditures, the 
regression in Table 5, Column 3 leads to an estimate on education that is statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that education expenditures do not have an effect on 
mobility for low-income individuals. Increases in expenditures for public education 
might be expected to provide valuable job skills for individuals of all incomes. These 
skills would then allow children born into low-income households to reach higher 
incomes as adults. However, my results suggest that education expenditures alone do 
not lead low-income individuals to reach higher incomes. This may be the case if public 
education expenditures support programs, like college preparatory classes that increase 
mobility for middle-class students, but not children in the bottom quartile. An 
alternative interpretation is that expenditures on public education do in fact help low 
income children realize higher incomes as adults, but that they lead to an equal advance 
for middle-income children. Because absolute mobility measures incomes in 
percentiles, if public education expenditures lead all students to higher incomes than 
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they were born into as well as low-income individuals, then this would not lead to an 
increase in expected income percentiles for low-income children. 
The results of the regression in Table 5 also indicate that the aggregate effect of 
various local government services, excluding welfare and education, over both decades, 
has a significant positive effect on mobility. The coefficient on expenditures for 
services other than welfare and education, summed over the 1980s and 1990s, is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.1% level. This coefficient of 0.205 suggests 
that a $1,000 increase in expenditures on services excluding education and welfare 
increases the expected income percentile of low-income children by almost a quarter of 
a percentile. This suggests that the aggregate effect of expenditures by local 
governments within a commuting zone, excluding welfare and education, lead to small 
but statistically significant increases in income mobility within their commuting zone. 
This consequence may arise from the combined effect of improvements in commuting 
zones that accompany better public safety, recreation options, transportation, utilities, 
and public health that improve the quality of life and help people to pursue 
opportunities for advancement. Alternatively, as suggested by the different effects of 
education and welfare spending, each individual category of public service mentioned 
above may have varying effects. The positive effect on mobility may be the result of 
one service, while other services have negligible effects. The specific categories of 
expenditures that lead to the aggregate increase in mobility of 0.205 percentiles should 
be the subject of further research. Whatever the breakdown of the effect of 
expenditures, this coefficient suggests that the aggregate effect of increased 
expenditures benefits the income mobility for poor children within a commuting zone. 
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State fixed effects play another important role in my model. This set of dummy 
variables captures the difference in mean outcomes for each state. It is included in the 
model to account for two main differences across states: the different roles of local 
governments within states and the differences of state governments themselves. The 
change in the size of the coefficient on local government expenditures after adding state 
fixed effects (in Column 3 of Tables 3 through 5) suggests that across-state differences 
play a role in the variation in income mobility across the U.S. Education, welfare, and 
tax policies, directed to helping the poor rise to higher incomes, vary across states and 
the state fixed effects in my model suggests that these policies create significantly 
different outcomes for residents of each state. 
The political economy of commuting zones likely varies across states and local 
governments and may influence the policies that affect income mobility. For example, 
Ichinio, Karabarbounis, and Moretti (2011) suggest that in countries where the poor 
participate more in politics, there are more likely to be redistributive government 
policies. Political economy may also matter across commuting zones as it does across 
countries and thus local expenditures may more often be spent on services aimed at 
improving income mobility for low-income earners in some commuting zones and not 
others depending on each unit’s political economy. Thus a future model could control 
for across-commuting zone factors of political economy to further to address what types 
of government expenditures improve mobility and which do not. 
6. Conclusion 
This study estimates the effect of local government expenditures on the expected 
incomes for low-income individuals. The primary question of this research asks whether 
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or not commuting zones that delivered a greater provision of public expenditures to 
their residents created better economic mobility for the poor. My results reveal a 
statistically significant relationship between local government expenditures and income 
mobility when controlling for demographic factors within commuting zones as well as 
differences across states. However, the estimates suggest that the kind of impact 
(positive or negative) and the significance of the effects depends on when expenditures 
occurred and what programs they funded. Further research might improve our 
understanding of how local governments affect income mobility through investigation 
into the causes for different effects across time, the effects of different types of local 
government policies, and the effects of state expenditures.   
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7. Appendix   
Table 1. This table shows the correlation between per capita expenditures, measured as 
the mean of the sampled years, within each decade. 
   VARIABLES Per Capita Expenditures 1980s Per Capita Expenditures 1990s    Per Capita Expenditures 80's 1.00  Per Capita Expenditures 90's 0.97 1.00        
Table 2. This table shows the correlation between per capita expenditures, measured as 
the mean of the sampled years, within each decade. 
     VARIABLES Per Capita Expenditures ‘82 Per Capita Expenditures ‘87 Per Capita Expenditures ‘92 Per Capita Expenditures ‘97      Per Capita Expenditures ‘82 1.00    Per Capita Expenditures ‘87 0.99 1.00   Per Capita Expenditures ‘92 0.96 0.96 1.00  Per Capita Expenditures ‘97 0.94 0.96 0.96 1.00           
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Table 3. This table shows the results of regressions of absolute mobility on per capita 
expenditures for the averages of years sampled by the Census Survey of 
Governments. 4 
 (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES Absolute Mobility Absolute Mobility Absolute Mobility     Per Capita Expenditures ‘80s -0.881*** (0.142) -0.170* (0.100) -0.237** (0.095)     Per Capita Expenditures ‘90s 1.619*** (0.257) 0.319* (0.180) 0.407** (0.175)         CZ Demographic Controls  X X State Fixed Effects   X     Constant 40.77 *** 31.12*** 37.12***  (0.563) (2.786) (2.387) Joint Effect of ‘90s and ‘80s 0.738*** (0.125) 0.149* (0.090) 0.171** (0.083)          Observations 701 701 701 R-squared 0.043 0.797 0.892 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
             
                                                        4 This regression includes dummy variables that represent the effect of missing observations in the data. 
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Table 4. This table shows the results of regressions of absolute mobility on per capita 
expenditures for specific years sampled by the Census Survey of Governments.5 
 (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES Absolute Mobility Absolute Mobility Absolute Mobility     Per Capita Expenditures ‘82 0.143 0.164 0.102  (0.288) (0.144) (0.102) Per Capita Expenditures ‘87 -1.364** -0.677** -0.587***  (0.640) (0.297) (0.211) Per Capita Expenditures ‘92 0.0464 0.423* 0.252  (0.516) (0.236) (0.183) Per Capita Expenditures ‘97 2.033*** 0.194 0.383**  (0.432) (0.228) (0.191)     CZ Demographic Controls  X X State Fixed Effects   X     Constant 40.30*** 31.01*** 36.66***  (0.605) (2.759) (2.373) Joint Effect of ’82, ’87, ’92 and ‘97 0.799*** 0.104 0.148*  (0.141) (0.091) (0.079)     Observations 701 701 701 R-squared 0.061 0.799 0.893 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
                                                        
5 This regression includes dummy variables that represent the effect of missing observations in the data. 
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Table 5. This table shows the results of regressions of absolute mobility on per capita 
expenditures on specific categories likely to affect low-income individuals, 
demographic controls and state fixed effects. 6 
 (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES Absolute Mobility Absolute Mobility Absolute Mobility     Per Capita Expenditures ‘80s, Education 0.267 (0.891) -0.047 (0.721) -0.667 (0.739) Per Capita Expenditures ‘90s, Education 4.430*** (1.100) 0.835 (0.727) 0.684 (0.715) Per Capita Expenditures ‘80s, Public Welfare 8.974* (4.805) 6.611** (2.585) -2.984 (2.739) Per Capita Expenditures ‘90s, Public Welfare -7.082 (4.368) -3.580 (2.273) -0.225 (2.143) Per Capita Expenditures ‘80s Minus Education and Public Welfare -0.808*** (0.247) -0.068 (0.168) -0.191 (0.149) Per Capita Expenditures ‘90s Minus Education and Public Welfare 0.721 (0.496) 0.064 (0.260) 0.396** (0.195)   CZ Demographic Controls  X X State Fixed Effects   X  Constant 36.70*** 32.06*** 36.98***  (0.903) (2.764) (2.401) Joint Effect of ‘80s and ‘90s Education Exps. 4.697*** (0.667) 0.788* (0.462) -0.016 (0.447) Joint Effect of ‘80s and ‘90s Welfare Exps. 1.891 (1.646) 3.031*** (0.989) -3.209* (1.916) Joint Effect of ‘80s and ‘90s Non-Welfare-Education Exps. -0.087 (0.294) -0.004 (0.127) 0.205*** (0.074) Observations 701 701 701 R-squared 0.117 0.802 0.892 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                        
6 This regression includes dummy variables that represent the effect of missing observations in the data. 
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Table 6. Summary statistics for commuting zone (CZ) demographic controls. Group 1 
is the set of observations with per capita greater than the median of per capita 
expenditures for the period spanning 1972 to 1997. Group 2 is group of observations 
above the median. “Mean#” denotes the mean of Group #. “Min#” denotes minimum of 
Group #. “Max#” denotes the maximum of Group 1.  ΔMean represents difference in 
mean values for two groups, which is statistically significant at the five percent level if 
accompanied by two or more asterisks. 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) VARIABLES Mean 1 Mean 2 Min 1 Min 2 Max 1 Max 2 ΔMean         Median Income ‘79  12,712 13,202 1.00e-08 1.00e-08 21,281 27,375  Median Age ‘80  122.6 102.8 1.00e-08 0 515 513.9 19.74*** Median House Price ‘80  30,125 38,265 1.00e-08 1.00e-08 60,550 130,400 8140*** % Urban ‘80  0.459 0.784 0 0 5.565 103.7 0.326 % White ‘80  0.827 1.094 0 0 5.781 117.1 0.267 Rate of Teen Births ‘80  0.00300 0.00341 0 0 0.0133 0.348 0.0004 % Employed in Manufacturing ‘80  
0.0855 0.0987 0 0 0.320 13.55 0.013 
Crime Rate ‘81  2,548 3,282 0 0 8,818 17,342 735.0*** Divorce Rate ‘84  38,677 205,988 1.00e-08 1.00e-08 368,983 4.765e+07 -167311 Crime Rate ‘85  0.0285 0.0593 0 0 0.246 6.975 0.031 % Social Security Payment Recipients ‘85  
0.185 0.234 0 0 1.256 20.58 0.049 
Median House Price ‘99  45,615 57,674 18,700 14,999 171,500 299,400 12060*** Percent Unemployed ‘90  
7.229 6.346 1.167 1 19.25 21.10 0.883*** 
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Table 6 continued 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) VARIABLES Mean1 Mean2 Min1 Min2 Max1 Max2 ΔMean 
        Median Age ‘90  34.78 34.49 25.15 21.34 51 45.57 0.297 % Employed in Manufacturing ‘97  
0.0648 0.0449 0 0 0.259 0.297 0.020*** 
% Divorced Males ‘90  0.0288 0.0317 0.0102 0.000583 0.230 0.579 0.003 % Social Security Payment Recipients ‘96 0.209 0.197 0.0950 0 1.224 1.545 0.012* % Public School Enrollment ’97  0.193 0.211 0 0 0.966 3.516 0.018 Crime Rate ‘96  167.0 518.1 0 0 5,132 26,250 351.0*** Median Household Income ‘99 21,445 24,779 11,534 12,262 41,072 51,112 3334.1***         
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
    
  
27  
Figure 1. This map, created by Chetty et. al (2013) maps absolute income mobility 
across United States commuting zones. Absolute mobility represents the expected 
income percentiles for individuals born into households at or below the 25th percentile. 
Darker areas on the map indicate lower levels of mobility. 7 
 
   
  
                                                        
7 Source: http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/website/v2.1/absolute_upward_mobility.jpg 
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Figure 2. This pie chart shows the portion of mean expenditures that went to each of the three 
spending categories of the regression in Table 5 for the 1980’s. Expenditures are measured per 
capita.                    
 
Figure 3. This pie chart shows the portion of mean expenditures that went to each of the three 
spending categories of the regression in Table 5 for the 1990’s. Expenditures are measured per 
capita. 
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Figure 4 This pie chart shows the portion of mean expenditures that went to each of the 
three spending categories of the regression in Table 5 for the mean of the 1990’s and 
1980’s. Expenditures are measured per capita. 
 
 
Figure 5 This pie chart shows the average amount spent on major spending categories 
relative to each other over the period from 1982 to 1997.  
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